The idiot by Michael, Mike
71
Porto Alegre, v. 16, n. 1, jan./jul. 2013
ISSN impresso 1516-084X    ISSN digital 1982-1654
INFORMÁTICA NA EDUCAÇÃO: teoria & prática
“But what kind of idiot is this?” Natasya Filippovna exclai-
med in indignation, stamping her foot at him. “Well, where 
are you going? Who are you going to announce?” 
(Fyodor Dostoyevsky, The Idiot)
“Something in the world forces us to think. This some-
thing is an object not of recognition but of a fundamental 
encounter. What is encountered may be Socrates, a temple 
or a demon. It may be grasped in a number of affective 
tones: wonder, love, hatred, suffering. In whichever tone, 
its primary tone is that it can only be sensed.
   (Gilles Deleuze, 2004, p.176)
1 Introduction
In this paper, I will examine a number of tre-atments of the notion of “the idiot” (along the way touching on some satellite concepts 
such as event, cosmopolitics, process, the vir-
tual) in order to explore the potential uses of 
the idiot in the ‘doings’ of social science. The 
attraction of the ‘idiot’ is that it provides a re-
source for addressing the essential openness 
of events – that is, their openness onto possi-
bility or the virtual. In other words, it is a me-
ans for not only making the point that things 
(and events) could be other than they are, but 
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that what things and events ‘are’ is constitu-
tively ‘other’, in that they are in a process of 
becoming. The upshot of this is to shift from a 
view of events and things in terms of problems 
in need of a solution (eg “how can we grasp 
– represent – them properly?”) to a vision of 
events and things as occasions for posing – in-
venting – more interesting problems (eg “what 
can be at stake here?”).
So, on one level, this paper attempts to 
sketch some conceptual parameters for the 
idiot. However, as opening remarks imply, this 
is supplemented by an effort to operationali-
ze the idiot as a practicable (though always 
problematic) means for re-thinking the ‘doin-
gs’ of social scientific research. I say ‘doings’ 
not only to connote the performativity of so-
cial scientific research, but also because I wish 
to begin to approach social science research 
in its complexity. Thus, for instance, the use 
of the idiot refers not only to its potential role 
in the analytic engagement with empirical ob-
jects and events (a matter of methodology) 
but also to the encounter with (in the broadest 
sense) disciplinary others (a matter of inter-
disciplinary process). Needless to say, this is a 
disambiguation of highly convoluted – indeed, 
topological – processes. Nevertheless, refra-
ming somewhat, the idea is to deploy the idiot 
as a way of beginning to access the complex 
prospects entailed in the doing social scientific 
research as it emerges in empirical, institutio-
nal, and personal forms. 
2 A handful of idiots…
In ancient Greece, the idiot was the indivi-
dual who simply would not participate in the 
politics of the state, preferring to pursue their 
own private concerns. As Lezaun and Soneryd 
(2007) put it “by minding exclusively his own 
affairs, (the idiot) became useless to the polis” 
(emphasis in the original, p. 295). This dimen-
sion of the self-oriented, private individual fin-
ds its echo in Deleuze whose, according to Fri-
da Beckman (2009), initial ‘philosophical idiot’ 
wasa character who insists on his own capacity 
for thought. This is the ‘private thinker’…” (p. 
56). As Beckman explicates, for the Deleuze 
of Difference and Repetition (2004) “The idiot 
takes the universal capacity to think for granted 
and …the philosopher fails to recognise that his 
self-reflection is based on a very strong pre-
supposition regarding his own natural capacity 
for thought. The idiot, in fact, naturalises these 
presuppositions of the Image of thought and 
conceals them as a pure element of common 
sense” (BECKMAN, 2009, p. 55).
However, for the Deleuze and Guattari of 
“What is Philosophy” (1994), the idiot has be-
come a conceptual persona that “wants to turn 
the absurd into the highest power of thought 
– in other words, to create” (DELEUZE; GUAT-
TARI, 1994, p. 62). As they go on to write: 
“The old idiot wanted, by himself, to account 
for what was or was not comprehensible, what 
was or was not rational, what was lost or sa-
ved; but the new idiot wants the lost, the in-
comprehensible, and the absurd to be restored 
to him” (p. 63). This is the Russian idiot. Beck-
man notes how Artaud (albeit problematically 
for Beckman, who finds a better instantiation 
in Kathy Acker), is the exemplary Russian idiot 
whose absurdist writings engage the “limitless 
plane of immanence… (that) also engenders 
hallucinations, erroneous perceptions, bad fe-
elings” (DELEUZE; GUATTARI, 1994, p. 49). 
This disorienting, affective dimension of the 
idiot is one to which we shall have reason to 
return. Certainly it was a dimension of one of 
literature’s most famous idiots, Dostoyevsky’s 
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Prince Myshkin. Over and above a narrative 
role as an “innocent character (that serves 
as) a satiric instrument for revealing the cor-
ruption of society, the inadequacy of its value 
systems or the stultifying nature of its institu-
tions” (MCDUFF, 2004, p. xxiv), Myshkin “stan-
ds out because he eludes the understanding of 
the (other characters)” (p. xxvi) who “fit him 
into their own patterns of distrust, self-hatred, 
lying and fraud” (p. xxvii). In all this Myshkin 
provokes a range of emotions: frustration, mo-
ckery, irritation, anger, rejection, love, accep-
tance, joy. It is almost as if the amorphous, 
unsettling affects – the bad feelings - he indu-
ces need to be domesticated, that is, rende-
red into those conventional emotion categories 
most familiar to the various characters who en-
counter him (MASSUMI, 2002). 
Now, this shift in Deleuze’s use of the idiot 
is itself unsettling. No longer is it a ‘satiric ins-
trument’, an instrument of radical critique (not 
least of the Cartesian cogito), but a conceptual 
persona whose role “is to show thought’s terri-
tories, its absolute deterritorializations and re-
territorializations” (DELEUZE; GUATTARI, 1994, 
p. 69). There is an ‘acritical turn’ as Stengers 
(2010a) puts it – the idiot is now attached to 
“amore truly immanent principle” (BECKMAN, 
2009, p. 57). On this score, Isabelle Stengers 
(2010a) notes that “What is Philosophy” see-
ms to betray the ‘conventional’view of Deleu-
ze and Guattari “as the thinkers of productive 
connections, the creation of deterritorializing 
processes escaping fixed identities, transgres-
sing boundaries and static classifications” (p. 
39). What is especially perplexing for Stengers 
is that they exercise a very modern partition 
between philosophy, art and science – we see 
this in, for instance, the distinction between 
conceptual personae and aesthetic figures, 
with their respective emphases on immanence 
and concepts, and composition and affects or 
percepts. However, this division reflects “What 
is Philosophy’s” self-exemplification of the new 
idiot as conceptual persona: it perplexes in or-
der to prompt a questioning of the conventio-
nal view of Deleuzian creation, a slowing down 
of the normal modes of practice. The topology 
of this slowing down is that it allows for ano-
ther sort of deterritorialization and reterritoria-
lization (see DELEUZE; GUATTARI, 1988): the 
idiot should, therefore be treated as an event 
(BECKMAN, 2009), or as a process (Michael, 
in press). 
3 An idiot in the hand…
In the last section, we saw how the concept 
of the idiot has evolved in the hands of De-
leuze. From his treatment, and the commen-
taries of Beckman and Stengers, we derived 
a number of broad parameters along which to 
demarcate the idiot. The idiot marks an event 
that is unsettling, it embodies and mediates 
an amorphously affective influence that needs 
to be domesticated or rendered practicable in 
some way: sometimes this takes the form of 
mobilizing conventional or habitual categories 
– emotion categories that ‘close down’ or re-
-territorialize the event of idiocy. But someti-
mes, the idiot enables an ‘opening up’ of the 
event, or as we shall trace in greater detail 
below, a ‘slowing down’ of default modes of 
action. 
In the work of Isabelle Stengers (2005), 
the idiot “resists the consensual way in which 
the situation is presented and in which emer-
gencies mobilize thought or action” (p. 994). 
Here, the ‘presentation of the situation’ takes 
place in what Stengers calls ‘cosmopolitical’ 
events – political events wherein participantac-
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tants include both the human and the nonhu-
man. The idiot stands outside of such events 
– refusing to enter them, responding in ways 
which are nonsensical in relation to how the 
event is consensually understood. Stengers 
(2005) writes: “the idiot can neither reply nor 
discuss the issue…(the idiot) does not know…
the idiot demands that we slow down, that we 
don’t consider ourselves authorized to believe 
we possess the meaning of what we know” (p. 
995). The tasks of those who inhabit the cos-
mopolitical event becomes one of “bestow(ing) 
efficacy upon the murmurings of the idiot, the 
‘there is something more important’ that is so 
easy to forget because it ‘cannot be taken into 
account’, because the idiot neither objects nor 
proposes anything that ‘counts’” (p. 1.001). By 
attending to the idiot’s nonsensicalness, there 
is opened up the prospect of a challenge to the 
‘standard’ meaning of the event. 
Latterly, Stengers (2010b) has argued that 
these cosmopolitical events incorporate the 
nonhuman ‘through’ the human: as she puts 
it, “if we take seriously those nonhumans that 
are best characterized as forcing thought ra-
ther than as the products of thought” then 
humans take on the guise of “spokespersons 
claiming that it is not their free opinions that 
matter but what causes them to think and to 
object, humans who affirm that their freedom 
lies in their refusal to break this attachment, 
even in the name of some common good” (p. 
5). However, this attachment is leavened by 
what Stengers (2010b) calls a “culture of he-
sitation” (p. 27, emphasis in original): in the 
concrete specificity of the cosmopolitical event, 
those expert spokespersons for the nonhuman 
encounter, and hesitate, in the face of “empo-
wered minorities who have become collectively 
able to object, question and impose as matte-
ring aspects of situations that would otherwise 
be mistreated or neglected” (p. 27). This has 
become a rhizomatic situation that parallels-
the dynamics of Callon et al’s (2001) ‘hybrid 
forums’ orthe topologies of Irwin and Michael’s 
(2003) ‘ethno-epistemic assemblages’. 
It would seem that in pursuing that which 
facilitates a slowing down or a hesitation of the 
cosmopolitical, Stengers has shifted her em-
phasis from the ‘idiot’ to the ‘minority’. Howe-
ver, I would suggest that we need to keep hold 
of the idiot’s greatest asset – its nonsensical-
ness, its absurdity. While empowered minori-
ties are necessarily present, the idiot is routi-
nely excised, ignored, or swallowed in the run 
of conventional emotions. 
In what follows, I will not be addressing the 
many complexities of the cosmopolitical event 
per se, but focus on a different event – the 
event of social science. By this I mean the 
doing of social scientific work whether that be 
empirical or analytic. What I am interested in is 
the way that idiots inhabit the empirical social 
scientific event and how we might analytically 
recover them in order to slow things down, to 
hesitate, to query thethought that “we possess 
the meaning of what we know”. 
Before this however, we need to do a lit-
tle ground-clearing around the notion of the 
event. Mariam Fraser’ (2010) compares the 
event in Whitehead and Deleuze. At base, for 
Fraser the event is an actual occasion made 
up of the coming together – concrescence 
(WHITEHEAD, 1929) – of disparate entities 
that social and material, human, nonhuman, 
and the more-than-human, macro, meso and 
micro, cognitive and affective, conscious, pre-
conscious and unconscious. Fraser identifies 
that what is distinctive in the Deleuzian event 
is that it is a moment where these constitu-
tive entities rather than simply ‘being togeth-
er’, ‘become together’’, that is to say, they are 
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transformed in the process of that interaction 
or, rather, intra-action (BARAD, 2007).
The idiot, insofar as it ‘enters into’ the social 
scientific empirical event,can serve to ‘trans-
form’ the other elements that make up the 
event. This is especially interesting in the pre-
sent discussion when one of the elements that 
is potentially transformed is the social scientific 
researcher. Under these circumstances, there 
is a possibility that the researcher can question 
what they believe they are ‘busy doing’ and 
begin to entertain the prospect that there is 
‘something more important’. In Fraser’s (2010) 
explication of the Deleuzian event, this reflects 
the view that the event is an occasion for ‘in-
ventive problem making’ in which the param-
eters of the issue at stake can fundamentally 
shift. That is to say, in the event, as the ele-
ments mutually change, so does the event – it 
can become an ‘issue’ that can be addressed 
in either of two ways. On the one hand, it can 
become a problem in need of a solution (“What 
is Prince Myshkin doing? Make things clear!” Or 
“what has happened in this interview? Some-
thing is amiss. There is a problem and we must 
account for it!” Or “why does Gino refuse to talk 
about what really matters?”). As we saw above, 
sometimes the resolution entails a recourse to 
familiar categories: Myshkin is a fraud and a 
scoundrel; my skills as an interviewer fail me, 
but I will learn to be a better interviewer (see 
Michael, 2004, in press a): Gino is an idiot (in 
the pejorative sense – see CALLON; RABEHA-
RISOA, 2004). On the other hand, the ‘issue’ 
can prompt a re-visioning of the event and the 
invention of a more important question (Why 
do we treat Myshkin so badly? How do non-
humans transform a social scientific interview 
into an occasion of institutional differentiation? 
How does Gino’s recalcitrance re-assert a tra-
ditional familial assemblage? As we have seen, 
for Stengers we need to cultivate a capacity to 
articulate these better problems. We shall sug-
gest one possible means for such invention of 
better problems below. 
Finally, we can note that the concept of the 
event deployed here assumes it to be funda-
mentally – to express what Massumi (2002) 
calls transitivity, but can also be framed in ter-
ms of virtuality (and potentiality – also see DE-
LANDA, 2002; BENNETT, 2010; however, HAR-
MAN, 2010 for a critical nuancing of the idea of 
the openness of the event). The event ‘opens 
out’ onto different possibilities. This is clearly 
evidenced in the shift from finding a solution 
to the ‘issue’ of an event (ie closing down the 
event and its meaning), to treating the event 
as an occasion for inventive problem-making 
(ie sustaining the openness of the event). Of 
course, this should hardly come as a surpri-
se when one imagines, following Mol (2001) 
and Law (2004) that the social scientific rese-
arch event is not so much representational (it 
does not simply depict more or less accurate-
ly some social event or other) as performati-
ve (it enacts that social event, and indeed, is 
enacted by that event – see HORST; MICHAEL, 
2011). The idiot, it will be suggested below, is 
a means to sustaining and exploring this open-
ness of the social scientific event. 
4 Handling the idiot….
The idiot’s nonsensical actions in the social 
scientific event are multifarious but we are not 
necessarily overtly aware of them. We might 
vaguely sense that something is amiss, but we 
cannot always put our finger on it. Michael (in 
press a) lists a number of ways in which rese-
arch participants ‘misbehave’: they can fail to 
keep an engagement such as an interview or a 
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focus group event, or else remove themselves 
from an ethnographic setting); they can fail to 
participate ‘appropriately’ because they are too 
tired, or drunk, or ill; they can refuse to en-
gage by willfully remaining silent or going off-
-topic; they can be disruptive by being aggres-
sive or antagonistic; or they can undermine or 
ironize the social scientific event by messing 
about, for instance, playfully competing with 
other participants to give the most extreme or 
the silliest response to a question. Notice, that 
to speak of this actions as ‘misbehaviours’ is to 
set up the social scientific event in which they 
occurred as a problem in need of a solution.
However, before such unhappy social scien-
tific research events can be formulated as pro-
blems, they have to be ‘noticed’ as such. It 
can be suggested that when such ‘deviations’ 
from the research event take place, they are 
often simply ignored (this can take several for-
ms from ‘being missed’, to not being recorded, 
to be sidelined from the analysis – see Micha-
el, in press). Even when they are formulated 
as a problem, then they are often accounted 
for in the genre of self-criticism (I am a poor 
or inexperienced or unlucky researcher). In all 
this, the problem is presupposed: good data 
were not collected, good analysis failed to take 
place. The solution is to better one’s ‘skill-set’ 
or seek out more training or select a less recal-
citrant sample or pick a more amenable case 
study. 
And yet, the idiot has had an affect. To em-
phasize, here ‘affect’ denotes the impact by 
objects and actions upon a body with its indivi-
dual, specific capacities – capacities that span 
the sensory, the reactive, the visceral, the aes-
thetic and so on (MASSUMI, 2002; BENNETT, 
2010). The affects operate below the surface 
of consciousness and while they might serve as 
aggravations or irritants, they are not always 
made manifest. When they do emerge they 
can take the form of emotions which, if we take 
constructionist accounts of emotions seriously 
(eg HARRE, 1986), means they are conventio-
nalized – they are mediated through various 
pre-existing emotion categories. To reiterate, 
these emotion categories can be fairly stan-
dard ones: they translate affects into the lo-
cally typical emotions of annoyance or anger 
or sense of failure or embarrassment (as we 
have seen in the case of poor Prince Myshkin). 
However, as Michael (2011) has pointed out, 
there is also an opportunity here to be atten-
tive to the complexity and amorphousness of 
these affects, indeed, to invent new emotion 
categories even – an invention that opens up 
the event. 
In the context of the cosmopolitical event, 
the role of the idiot has a certain immediacy, 
and the culture of hesitation needs to be fully 
available if the process of slowing down, or 
querying the consensus is to have any chan-
ce of taking place, let alone suceeding. In the 
case of the social science research event, the-
re is perhaps less urgency – the murmurings 
of the idiot, as noted above can be marginali-
zed through various tacit practices or subdued 
through the operation of any number of con-
ventional emotions. However, there is a possi-
bility that the idiot’s murmurings can continue 
to have an affect resonance: that beneath the 
deafening silence or symphonic emotions, tho-
se murmurings gently resonate. The question 
arises, how do they become accessible as idio-
tic, as opening up the original social science 
research event. 
One possible way in which the idiotic can be 
recovered is through the anecdote (MICHAEL, 
2011, in press b). Now, the immediately perti-
nent aspects of the anecdote can be formula-
ted as follows: 
77
Porto Alegre, v. 16, n. 1, jan./jul. 2013
ISSN impresso 1516-084X    ISSN digital 1982-1654
INFORMÁTICA NA EDUCAÇÃO: teoria & prática
 • It is an ambiguous genre that is both li-
terary (a constructed story) and factual 
a report or document of acual events).
 • It enters into and acts upon the histori-
cal record: the very reportage and cir-
culation of an anecdote has effects – it 
is performative.
 • It connotes how the anecdotalised 
eventitself contributes to the making of 
its author who remake that event. Topo-
logically, the author emerges from the 
‘event’ that renders the incident ‘ane-
cdotable’. 
The anecdote told of a particular past idiotic 
event is a partial effect of that particular past 
event. A prior event that has been rendered 
into an anecdote serves in its own anecdota-
lization, even as the telling of that anecdote-
renders that past event recoverable or narra-
table. This is because events impact affectively 
upon the persons involved (in the present case 
the social scientific researcher) and as such 
they are in part constitutive of those persons. 
At some point the person can go back to the 
event, re-narrate it, challenge the conventio-
nal view of, and the standard emotion atta-
ched to, that event. The social science resear-
ch event that was once painfully remembered 
as being marred by participants’ misbehaviour 
and conventionally put down to inexperience 
is revisioned as an occasion for – an invitation 
to – participants to ‘misbehave’ in particular 
idiotic ways. In other words, it was an event 
that overspilled the impoverished formula-
tions of social science. It could be argued that 
this revisioning simply reflects the subsequent 
analytic resources accumulated by the resear-
cher. For instance, elsewhere I have anecdota-
lized an interview marred by the ‘idiotic mis-
behaviours’ of a participant and her companion 
animals in terms of the complex, parasitical 
interactions of hybrids (MICHAEL, 2004). This 
could be put down to my subsequent academic 
engagement with, for instance, actor-network 
theory. However, one might equally argue that 
what allowed actor-network theory to take an 
intellectual hold of someone who was at the 
time a radical social constructionist were the 
affectsengendered bythat original idiotic event 
(MICHAEL, in press b). 
One might distill the foregoing as follows: 
the idiot ventriloquizes the researcher and the 
event anecdotalizes itself. However, note that 
this is a process. There is nothing here that 
guarantees that this is the final eventualiza-
tion of the original event. Some time in the 
future, another aspect of the idiot of the ‘origi-
nal’ event might reveal itself and another ane-
cdotalization might be set in motion. At stake 
here is that the transitivity – the vituality – of 
the event is sustained: the event remains open 
and its conventional and consensual readings 
remain contestable. Indeed, the idiotic reading 
of the original event – which itself amounts to 
a domestication – likewise should remain open 
and contestable.
Thus far, the discussion has addressed the 
idiot in a reactive register. An idiot is encounte-
red, and the response is to seek the best way 
to mobilize its promise. However, we might 
also ask if it is possible to deploy the idiot: to 
invent an idiot and send it out into the world to 
tease open closed events, to trouble the con-
ventional and challenge the consensual. 
5 Handing over the idiot…
So where might we find a resource for this 
proactive idiocy? I would suggest that what is 
sometimes called ‘Speculative Design’ is an ex-
cellent candidate. My first encounter with this 
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approach to (interaction) design was itself idio-
tic. Tobie Kerridge’s Biojewellery project pro-
voked a mixture of frustration and annoyance 
(for a detail account of thisproject website go 
to: url: http://www.biojewellery.com/ - last vi-
sited 21 November 2010). This was a public 
engagement with science and technology pro-
ject and yet bore little resemblance to what 
I understood, from a Science and Technology 
Studies (STS) perspective, to be a public en-
gagement with science and technology (PEST) 
project. In brief, Biojewellery involved volun-
teer couples who donated live jawbone cells 
(while having wisdom teeth removed). The the 
cells were cultured and then shaped and deco-
rated with precious metals to form rings that 
could be exchanged between the members 
of each couple. As has been noted elsewhere 
(MICHAEL, in press a), the project lacked se-
veral of the crucial elements that are usually 
associated with STS PEST (such as a focus on 
a more or less well-defined controversy or an 
attempt to systematically collect and analy-
se public views on the issue). It took a while 
to re-articulate the initial affects provoked by 
(the idiocy of) Biojewellery from conventional 
ones of frustration and annoyance (and let us 
not forget disgust), and to ‘open up’ – that is, 
expose the virtual in - the event of that initial 
encounter with Biojewellery. Biojewellery was 
operating with models of the public, of kno-
wledge, of politics, of scholarly purpose that 
made me want to slow down and reflect on the 
presuppositions that underpinned STS PEST. 
Let me give another example of the way 
that a speculative design prototype can idio-
tically challenge the conventional view of an 
event – and this idiocy is something that can-
not necessarily be foreseen by the designers. 
Bill Gaver and his team at the Interaction 
Research Studio at Goldsmiths, University of 
London developed a series of threshold devices 
that were designed to explore the parameters 
of domestic space (GAVER et al., 2008). One 
such object – the local barometer –comprised 
a number of small screens distributed around a 
volunteer’s residence. These displayed adver-
tisements scraped from an on-line small ads 
website. The ads were selected via an anemo-
meter – measuring wind speed and direction 
– that was attached to the roof of the property. 
Advertisements were thus blown into the home 
on the dual bases of windspeed (the stronger 
the wind the further way the source of the ob-
ject being advertised) and wind direction (wind 
from the north would mean that advertise-
ments from a northerly neighbourhood were 
blown in). This local barometer could be con-
sidered idiotic insofar as it made little sense to 
use such anarbitraryprinciple on which to base 
selection of ads. One of the objectives was to 
explore how neighbourhoods were imagined – 
the sorts of economic and social assumptions 
that were tacitly attached to the different nei-
ghbourhoods surrounding the residence. Ini-
tially, the volunteer found the local barometer 
aggravating –indeed, it was conventionalized 
as yet another medium by which the ‘unwel-
comed commercial’could enter the home. Ho-
wever this gradually shifted as the volunteer 
began to take note of certain advertised ite-
ms of interest (for instance, items which held 
special meaning for him, or contravened his 
cognitive map of the neighbourhoods). Howe-
ver, of particular interest for the present pa-
per was the rather unexpected finding that the 
volunteer began to read the weather through 
the advertisements: the neighbourhoods from 
which the advertised objects originated began 
to signify weather conditions. The more ‘in-
teresting problem’ that came to be invented 
through the idiotic objects of the local baro-
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meter concerned the conceptualization of the 
neighbourhood. From a sociological construct 
this took on a more heterogeneous character – 
it combined the socio-economic and the mete-
orological, the commercial and the barometric. 
In other words, the‘more interesting problem’ 
domain that emergedcentred on natureculture 
or technonature (eg WHITE; WILBERT, 2009).
Now, the discussion of the peculiar idiocy of 
the local barometer is an STS one – it is an 
attempt to come to grips with the oddness em-
bodied in the prototypes of Speculative Design. 
This interdisciplinary encounter between Spe-
culative Design and STS, and what subsequen-
tly has become a full-blown collaboration (see 
the project Sustainability Invention and Energy 
Demand Reduction: Co-Designing Communi-
ties and Practice – http://www.ecdc.ac.uk)can 
be illuminated by Barry’s (BARRY et al., 2009; 
BORN; BARRY, 2010) recent discussions of the 
logics of interdisciplinarity and in particular the 
logic of ontology. In brief, for Barry one of the 
most interesting prospects of interdisciplinari-
ty is that the collaboration between divergent 
disciplines can generate new objects of study. 
This is because, when things go well, new con-
nections are brought in to object of study by 
the discipines. The relationalities out of which 
the object is composed – and hence the object 
itself – multiply and alter through collaboration. 
As we have seen above, this encounter betwe-
en disciplines can be an idiotic one. Practitio-
ners of one discipline can simply not grasp – 
find nonsensical – the objects of study of the 
other discipline. If the affective response to this 
idiocy can translate into a new object of study 
– a new, indeed, inventive framing of the pro-
blem. In the case of the collaboration between 
Speculative Design and STS, inventive problem 
making has entailed the peculiar invention of 
the idiot that has been set out in this paper. 
6 Concluding remark: idiot-to-
hand…
This paper has attempted to draw a particu-
lar trajectory through various formulations of 
the idiot towards a version that cannot in the 
end be ‘methodologized’. At best, this paper 
has pointed toward an idiot that is part pro-
cess, part sensibility, part ethos. In the end, 
the presence of the idiot – its emergence is 
always surprising because at the moment it 
has managed to ‘force’ one’s thinking (in this 
case, where thinking relates to the doing of so-
cial science research), to slow it down, to open 
it up, it is also transforming the thinker (the 
social science researcher). The idiot-to-hand 
necessarily bites the hand that feeds it…
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